Intelligent agents must update their knowledge base as they acquire new information about their environment. The modal logic S5 n has been designed for representing knowledge bases in societies of agents. Halpern and Vardi have proposed the notion of re nement of S5 n Kripke models in order to solve multi-agent problems in which knowledge evolves. We argue that there are some problems with their proposal and attempt to solve them by moving from Kripke models to their corresponding trees. We de ne re nement of a tree with a formula, show some properties of the notion, and illustrate with the muddy children puzzle. We show how some diagnosis problems in engineering can be modelled as knowledge-based multi-agent systems, and hence how our approach can address them.
Introduction

Temporal epistemic modal logics and their potential for applications
In the last few years there is been a growing trend towards applying logical theories (and MultiAgent theories in general) to the speci cation and analysis of engineering products. The reason behind this trend is that logic is a precise and unambiguous language, and it is increasingly seen a useful tool for specifying, reasoning about and validating complex systems.
Agent theories (see Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) for a review) aim to represent key properties of an intelligent entity such as its knowledge, beliefs, intentions, desires, actions and most importantly its temporal evolution in a changing environment. Although much literature has been published in all of these areas, there is a general consensus about using epistemic and temporal modal logics, in which much progress has been made.
Epistemic modal logics (see Hintikka (1962) , Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1995) , Meyer and van der Hoek (1995) ) aim to represent the state of knowledge of an agent and to study what properties the state of knowledge should satisfy. This is formally done by using a classical modal operators de ned on a Kripke style semantics Kripke (1959) . Temporal modal logics (see Gabbay, Hodkinson and Reynolds (1993) , Clarke and Emerson (1981) , Emerson (1990) , Lamport (1994) , Pnueli (1977) , Shoham (1987) ) use a similar technical tool to represent the temporal evolution of a system and investigate properties of this evolution.
In this paper we try to develop further part of this tool and we suggest that this can be proven useful in a practical example, speci cally fault diagnosis in a distributed robotics situation. We examine a quite well known puzzle studied in computer science known as the muddy children puzzle and demonstrate that this example is conceptually equivalent to integrity self-checking in a robotics plant. We propose a general algorithm that can be applied in similar situations involving distributed knowledge among a group of agents.
The theoretical background
The logic S5 n models a community of ideal knowledge agents. Ideal knowledge agents have, among others, the properties of veridical knowledge (everything they know is true), positive introspection (they know what they know) and negative introspection (they know what they do not know). The modal logic S5 n (see for example Popkorn (1994) and Goldblatt (1992) ) can be axiomatised by taking all the propositional tautologies; the schemas of axioms 2 i ( ) ) ) 2 i ) 2 i , 2 i ) , 2 i ) 2 i 2 i , 3 i ) 2 i 3 i , where i 2 A represents an agent in the set of agents A = f1; : : : ; ng; and the inference rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation.
The logic S5 n has also been extended to deal with properties that arise when we investigate the state of knowledge of the group. Subtle concepts like common knowledge and distributed knowledge have been very well investigated (as in Fagin et al. (1995) ). The logic S5 n is a successful tool for the agent theorist also because, even in its extensions to common knowledge and distributed knowledge, it has important meta-properties like closure under substitution, completeness and decidability (see for example Meyer and van der Hoek (1995) ).
The standard (consequence relation) approach to using S5 n is to describe a situation as a set of formulas ?, and to attempt to show that the situation satis es a property by establishing ?` or ? . Establishing ?` involves nding a proof of from ?, while establishing ? involves reasoning about all (usually in nitely many) Kripke models satisfying ? to show that they also satisfy . The completeness of S5 n shows that these two notions are equivalent. However, experience has shown that this approach is computationally very expensive.
In order to overcome the intractability of this approach, Halpern and Vardi have proposed to use model checking as an alternative to theorem proving Halpern and Vardi (1991) . In the model checking approach, the situation to be modelled is codi ed as a single Kripke model M rather than as a set of formulas ?. The task of verifying that a property holds boils down to checking that M satis es , written M . This task is computationally much easier than the theorem proving task, being linear in the size of M and the size of Halpern and Vardi (1991) .
Halpern and Vardi informally illustrate their approach by modelling the muddy children puzzle.
In that puzzle, there are n children and n atomic propositions p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n representing whether each of the children have mud on their faces or not. Various announcements are made, rst by the father of the children and then by the children themselves. The children thus acquire information about what other children know, and after some time the muddy ones among them are able to conclude that they are indeed muddy. We describe the problem in greater detail below.
Halpern and Vardi propose the following way of arriving at the model M to be checked. They start with the most general model for the set of atomic propositions at hand. In order to deal with the announcements made, they successively re ne the model with formulas expressing the announcements made. This re nement process consists of removing some links from the Kripke model. At any time during this process, they can check whether child i knows p i (for example), by checking whether the current model satis es 2 i p i .
This method is illustrated in the paper Halpern and Vardi (1991) and the book Fagin et al. (1995) , but a precise de nition of the re nement operation is not given. Our original aim for this paper was to provide such a de nition and explore its properties. However, we soon came to the opinion that there is no de nition of model re nement on arbitrary S5 n Kripke structures that will have intuitively acceptable properties. We explain our reasons for this view in section 2. We believe the re nement and model checking ideas can still be made to work, however. In section 3 we introduce a structure derived from a Kripke model, which we call a Kripke tree, and de ne the re nement operation on Kripke trees. We illustrate this notion using the muddy children example in section 4. We prove some some properties of the re nement operation on Kripke trees in section 5 and we conclude with some discussion in section 6. This is mainly a theoretical paper. However, we argue that scenarios conceptually equivalent to the muddy children puzzle can occur in robotics. We describe one of these scenarios in section 2 and we solve it in section 4 by applying the technical machinery we develop in section 3.
Syntax and semantics
We assume nite sets P of propositional atoms, and A of agents. Formulas are given by the usual grammar:
::= p j : j 1^ 2 j 2 i j C where p 2 P and i 2 A. Intuitively the formula 2 i represents the assertion that the agent i knows the fact represented by the formula . The other propositional connectives can be de ned in the usual way. The modal connectives 3 i , E and B are de ned as: 3 i means :2 i : E means V i2A 2 i B means :C: 3 i means \it is consistent with i's knowledge that ", E means that everyone knows , while C is the much stronger statement that is common knowledge. In a multi-agent setting, a formula is said to be common knowledge if it is known by all the agents, and moreover that each agent knows that it is known by all the agents; and moreover, each agent knows that fact, and that one, etc. An announcement of results in common knowledge of among the hearers, because as well as hearing they also see that the others have heard it too (we assume throughout that all the agents are perceptive, intelligent, truthful). If one agent secretly informs all the others of , the result will be that everyone knows , but will not be common knowledge. B is the dual of C. Although not particularly useful intuitively, we will need it for technical reasons.
We will also need the following de nitions.
De nition 1.1 A formula is universal if it has only the modalities C; E; 2 i and no negations outside them. Formally take ::= p j : j 1^ 2 j 1 _ 2 and de ne a formula to be universal if it follows the following syntax:
::= j 1 _ 2 j 1^ 2 j 2 i j E j C De nition 1.2 A formula is safe if it is universal and, after negations are pushed inwards, no 2 i and no C appears in the scope of _. Formally take ::= p j : j 1^ 2 j 1 _ 2 and de ne a formula to be safe if it follows the following syntax:
::= j 1^ 2 j 2 i j E j C De nition 1.3 A formula is disjunction-free if it is universal and has no _. Formally take ::= p j : j 1^ 2 and de ne a formula to be disjunction-free if it follows the following syntax:
::= j 1^ 2 j 2 i j E j C De nition 1. k > 1 then each child can see another with mud on its forehead, so each one knows that at least one in the group is muddy. The father rst announces that at least one of them is muddy (which, if k > 1, is something they know already); and then he repeatedly asks them`Does any of you know whether you have mud on your own forehead?' The rst time they all answer`no'. Indeed, they go on answering`no' to the rst k ? 1 questions; but at the kth those with muddy foreheads are able to answer`yes'. At rst sight, it seems rather puzzling that the children are eventually able to answer the father's question positively. The clue to understanding what goes on lies in the notion of common knowledge. Although everyone knows the content of the father's initial announcement, the father's saying it makes it common knowledge among them, so now they all know that everyone else knows it, etc. Consider a few cases of k. k = 1, i.e. just one child has mud. That child is immediately able to answer`yes', since she has heard the father and doesn't see any other child with mud. To see that it was not common knowledge before the father's announcement that one of the children was muddy, consider again k = 2, say a; b. Of course a and b both know someone is muddy (they see each other), but, for example, a doesn't know that b knows that someone is dirty. For all a knows, b might be the only dirty one, and therefore not be able to see a dirty child.
An engineering example
The muddy children puzzle, together with its many variants like the three wise men puzzle, etc. is popular among computer scientists. The reason is that it encodes subtle properties about reasoning, while also being applicable to real life scenarios. We can imagine an example in which an engineering system could bene t from being able to cope with muddy-children-like situations.
Consider a factory in which similar robots collectively manufacture an object while moving in group in a large space. The robots can roughly be thought of being made of two components: the reasoning module and the mechanical actuators, e ectively operating on the object. We want to design a fault detection system for the actuators. Given the large area the robots can be in, the installation of cameras to monitor the operational status of the robots' arms is not an option.
Let us suppose that the robots have a visual system directed towards the other robots that can detect faults in their mechanical arms. Note this is quite a reasonable assumption, since it is often problematic to have visual systems that can do self-monitoring as well as monitoring the environment. Suppose now that the factory has a quality control mechanism that can detect if something went wrong during the production of the object and assume this device broadcasts an alarm every time it notices a defect in the production.
This robotic scenario complies with the muddy children example: the children are now robots, the role of the father is taken by the fault detection system. Note that the assumption of communication being common knowledge is not violated because messages are assumed to be broadcasted to all the agents. The task of the robots is then to reason about their status and stop their operation in case they come to know that their mechanical arm is faulty. The evolution of their knowledge proceeds exactly as the case of the muddy children example where we assume the robots to operate synchronously.
Assuming the robots have a reasoning module able to handle the muddy children problem, the group of robots is then e ectively able to do collective diagnosis.
In the following we refer our discussion to muddy children, but the above scenario can serve equally well.
Halpern and Vardi's formulation
Suppose A = f1; : : : ng and P = fp 1 ; : : : ; p n g; p i means that the ith child has mud on its forehead.
Suppose n = 3. The assumption of this puzzle is that each child can see the other children but cannot see itself, so each child knows whether the others have mud or not, but does not know about itself. Under these assumptions, Halpern and Vardi propose the Kripke structure of Figure  1 to model the initial situation.
Let w be any world in which there are at least two muddy children (i.e. w is one of the four upper worlds). In w, every child knows that at least one of the children has mud. However, it is not the case that it is common knowledge that each child has mud, since the world at the bottom of the lattice is reachable (cf. Theorem 1.5).
To model the father's announcement, Halpern and Vardi re ne the model M 1 in Figure 1 , arriving at M 2 in Figure 2 (these gures also appear in Halpern and Vardi (1991) , Fagin et al. (1995) ). The re nement process is not precisely de ned in Halpern and Vardi (1991) Figure 3: M 3 : The Kripke structure after the children announce that they don't know whether they are muddy.
(1995), though arguments in favour of the transformation from M 1 to M 2 are given.
Suppose now that the father asks the children whether they know whether they are muddy or not, and the children answer simultaneously that that they do not. Halpern and Vardi argue that this renders all models in which there is only one muddy child inaccessible, resulting in M 3 ( Figure 3 ).
If there are precisely two children with mud (i.e. the actual world is one of the three in the second layer), then each of the muddy children now knows it is muddy. For suppose the actual world is the left one of those three, i.e. w with (w) = fp 1 ; p 2 g. We easily verify that M 3 j = w 2 1 p 1 and M 3 j = w 2 2 p 2 .
If all three children are muddy, i.e. the actual world w is the top one, then we are not yet done, for we do not have M 3 j = w 2 i p i for any i. The father again asks each of the children if they know if they are muddy, and the model is re ned again according to their answer \no", resulting in M 4 which is M 3 with the last remaining links removed. (M 4 is not illustrated.) We can easily check that M 4 j = w 2 i p i for each i.
In summary, the method proposed by Halpern and Vardi for solving muddy-children-type puzzles is the following. Start with a suitably general model M 1 re ecting the initial set-up of the puzzle. Re ne it successively by the announcements made. At the end of the announcements, check formulas against the re ned model. In the example above, we re ned M 1 rst by 1 = C(p 1 _ p 2 _ p 3 ) (the father's announcement), and then twice by 2 = C(:2 1 p 1^: 2 1 :p 1 )^C(:2 2 p 2^: 2 2 :p 2 )^C(:2 3 p 3^: 2 3 :p 3 ) which corresponds to each of the three children announcing that they don't know whether they are muddy or not.
Halpern and Vardi do not precisely de ne what re nement by a formula means. The intuition they give is that re nement removes a minimal set of links of the model, so that the model satis es the formula at the actual world. Removing links means that epistemic possibilities are removed, that is, knowledge is gained, so this seems intuitively the right thing to do.
Problems with re nement of Kripke models
Let us write M to denote the result of re ning the model M by the formula . Thus, in the example above, M 2 = M 1 1 , etc.
The muddy-children example discussed above naturally lead us to the question of whether it is possible to make precise the notion of re nement of a Kripke model by a formula, and of what properties this would have. Essentially any re nement procedure will remove the links to the states that are responsible for the non-satisfaction of the formula we are re ning with. However, some unexpected problems of any natural procedure operating on Kripke models can be found.
Consider the following examples.
Example 2.1 Let M 5 be the Kripke model illustrated in Figure 4 , with the left-hand world w the actual world, and consider re ning by 2 1 p. The de nitions we examined di ered in subtle cases involving quite complex formulas and models, but they all agreed in this one: the resulting model must be M 6 (see gure). What happens is that agent 1 gains the knowledge of p, and so must eliminate the epistemic possibility of :p by removing the link. The counterintuitive property of this example is that M 5 j = w 2 3 3 1 p, while M 6 6 j = w 2 3 3 1 p.
Thus, in M 5 , agent 3 knows that p is consistent with 1's knowledge. But after 1 learns p for sure in M 6 , 3 no longer knows this! Example 2.2 Figure 5 shows a model and (the only) two outcomes one could consider for its re nement by 2 1 2 2 (p _ q). One must remove either the 1 link or the 2 link in order to prevent the 1{2 path to the world exhibiting :(p _ q). The choice is which link to remove. Both outcomes reveal undesirable properties of the re nement operator. In the rst case, removing the 1 link adds too much to 1's knowledge (he learns p), while the second case gives us a situation in which a model satis es 2 3 3 2 :q but its re nement by 2 1 2 2 (p _ q) does not. It is counterintuitive that 3's knowledge should change in this way when we re ne by 2 1 2 2 (p _ q).
The second case at least has the desirable property that a minimal change of the knowledge of agents at the actual world w is made, since the set of reachable states from w is maximised (cf. Theorem 1.5).
Example 2.3 Re nement by universal formulas (de nition 1.1) ought to be cumulative, and such formulas ought to commute with each other (i.e. M = M
). However, another example
shows that this will be hard to achieve. Consider the model M 7 shown at the top of Figure 6 , and let = 2 1 p and = 2 1 2 2 (p _ q). Whatever way one thinks about de ning , the result in the left-hand branch seems clear. Note that M 7 2 1 p already satis es 2 1 2 2 (p _ q) and therefore M 7 2 1 p 2 1 2 2 (p _ q) = M 7 2 1 p. An argument for the stated result of M 7 2 1 2 2 (p _ q) was given in Example 2.2, and further re ning by 2 1 p leaves little room for maneuver. However, the resulting models di er on whether they satisfy (for example) 2 3 2 2 q.
Example 2.3 shows that even universal formulas, do not enjoy commutativity in any reasonable re nement setting. However, commutativity for universal formulas seems intuitively correct: the order in which ideal agents acquire information should not matter. Non-universal formulas are a 
Re ning Kripke trees
Some of the problems exhibited by the three examples at the end of the preceding section seem to be due to the following fact: when we remove a link in a Kripke model in order to block a certain path, we also block other paths that used that link. To overcome this problem, we would like to unravel Kripke models into trees, in which each link participates in just one path. At rst sight this looks like it will destroy the niteness of our models, a feature on which e ective re nement and model checking operators rely. To retain niteness, we will need to limit in advance the maximum nesting of boxes that is allowed, and construct a tree to depth greater than this number. Semantic structures similar to Kripke trees have been de ned in Hughes and Cresswell (1984) . Our de nition di ers in detail from the one in Hughes and Cresswell (1984) , but it largely agrees with it in spirit.
In this section we de ne the notion of Kripke tree, show a translation of equivalence Kripke models into Kripke trees and de ne an algorithm for re ning knowledge structures. We also allow the empty tree (?; ?; ?) which we write as ?. It has no root. De nition 3.2 (Generated Kripke Tree) Let M = (W; ; ; w 0 ) be an equivalence Kripke model. The Kripke tree T M = (V; E; ) generated by M is given as follows:
Kripke trees: basic de nitions
The set of vertices is the set of paths in M: The valuation is de ned by (p) = f(w 0 ; i 1 ; w 1 ; : : : ; w k ) j w k 2 (p)g. The vertex w 0 2 V is the root of the tree.
When the model M is clear from the context or not relevant we will simply indicate the tree as T.
Kripke trees are irre exive, intransitive, anti-symmetric, anti-convergent and serial.
If M has at least two distinct worlds related by some i , then T M is in nite. For our purposes of model re nement, we usually want to deal with nite trees. T k M is T M with paths truncated at length k. Obviously by truncating the tree we will lose seriality.
De nition 3.3 (Truncated tree of depth k) Given a tree T = (V; E; ), the truncated tree of depth k is de ned as T k = (V 0 ; E 0 ; 0 ), where V 0 = fv 2 V j the distance of v from the root is less or equal than kg. For the case of truncated tree, Lemma 3.5 is not valid. However, we can prove a related result for formulas up to a certain level of modal nesting.
We inductively de ne the rank of a formula as follows:
De nition 3.7 (Rank of a formula) The rank rank( ) of a formula is de ned as follows:
rank(p) = 0, where p is a propositional atom.
rank(: ) = rank( ).
rank( 1^ 2 ) = maxfrank( 1 ); rank( 2 )g. rank( 1 _ 2 ) = maxfrank( 1 ); rank( 2 )g. rank(2 i ) = rank( ) + 1.
rank(C ) = 1.
The rank of a formula intuitively represents the maximum number of nested modalities that occur in . If an operator C occurs in we take the value of rank( ) to be in nite. The rank of a formula re ects the maximal length of any path that needs to be explored to evaluate on an in nite tree. In other words, to evaluate a formula of rank k at w 0 we need not examine worlds whose distance from w 0 is greater than k.
Kripke trees: re nement
In section 2.4, we discussed the di culties that arise when using equivalence Kripke models as knowledge structures for re nement. Example 2.3 showed that any straightforward procedure to re ne an equivalence Kripke model will be non-commutative even for universal formulas, i.e. there will be universal ; , such that M 6 M . Commutativity for universal formulas can be achieved by shifting to Kripke trees. Before we can show this, we must de ne re nement on Kripke trees.
The typical working scenario in which we operate is the same one as that advocated by Halpern and Vardi (1991) , except that we re ne T k M instead of M. It can be described as follows: we are given an initial con guration of a MAS, and a set of formulas f 1 ; : : : ; m g that represent the update of the scenario. The question is whether the updated con guration will validate a set of formulas f 1 ; : : : ; l g. We assume every to have nite rank, i.e. we cannot check a formula containing the operator of common knowledge. There is no restriction on the s. Our method operates as follows:
1. Start from the most general equivalence Kripke model M that represents the MAS. 2. Generate the in nite tree T M , as given in De nition 3.2. 3. Generate from T k M , the truncated tree of depth k, for some su ciently large k. 4 . Sequentially re ne T k M with f 1 ; : : : ; m g, 5. Check whether the resulting tree structure satis es f 1 ; : : : ; l g. The method described above needs some further explanation. First, what is the most general Kripke model representing a MAS con guration? How are we to build it? Our answer is the same as that given by Halpern and Vardi. Assume the set of atoms P is nite, as we set it to be in Section 1.3. We take the model whose universe W is equal to 2 P with an interpretation that covers all the possible assignments to the atoms. We take i ; i 2 A to be the universal relations on W W, and w 0 to be the actual world of the given MAS.
In general we will require that M is more speci c than the most general model, e.g. some agent
will have a certain knowledge about the world. We can add all the formulas that need be satis ed to the set of updates f 1 ; : : : ; m g. For example in the muddy children example we can start from the model with universal relations and add
to the set of updates. We have already explained how to execute steps 1, 2, 3, and 5. We now present a notion of re nement to execute step 4.
De nition 3.13 (Re nement of Kripke tree structures) Given a truncated Kripke tree T m = (V; E; ), a point v 2 V , and a formula , the result T 0 = (T; v) of re ning T by at v is procedurally de ned as follows. We assume that the negation symbols in apply only to atomic propositions (to achieve this, negations may be pushed inwards using de Morgan laws and dualities Lemma 3.14 Given a tree T, a formula and a point v, (T; v) is a tree. Proof It Follows from the fact that if T is a tree then Tj V 0 is also a tree.
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The intuition behind (T; v) is that it is obtained by removing as small a set of links from T as possible, in order to satisfy . Note that, due to the clauses for the connectives _; 3 i ; B, we have that the tree (T; v) is not uniquely de ned. However, we will see that running the procedure on the muddy children example does not introduce nondeterminism. 4 The muddy children puzzle using Kripke trees In section 2.1, we described the muddy children puzzle and we reported the formalisation that was given in Fagin et al. (1995) , Halpern and Vardi (1991) . The aim of the present section is to solve an instance of it (where the actual situation is coded by the tuple p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 that we equivalently write as (1; 1; 1); all the children are muddy) by using Kripke trees and the methods we introduced in section 3.
We start with the most general model to represent the puzzle: this is the model M 1 of Figure 1 1 . Given M 1 , we generate the in nite tree T M1 for M 1 and then the truncation T 1 of T M1 . In this 1 According the the notion of most general model as described in section 3.2 the model M should actually be M = (2 fp 1 ;p 2 ;p 3 g ; U; ; w), where U is a family of universal relations on W W , and (w) = fp 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 g. The model M 1 we analyse is the result of the update of M by C(p i ) K j p i ) : i 6 = j; i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g; where the formula above represents the fact that children can see each other. For brevity (as in Fagin et al. (1995) , Halpern and Vardi (1991) ) we start our analysis from M 1 ; i.e. rather than building the tree for M and update it rst by C(p i ) K j p i ), we directly build the tree for M 1 . The reader can check that this leads to the same result.
example, we only need three levels to be unravelled. The starting tree and the three successive re nements are in Figure 7 , and 8. Let 1 = C(p 1 _p 2 _p 3 ) (this is the father's announcement), and 2 = C(:2 1 p 1^: 2 1 :p 1 )^C(:2 2 p 2^: 2 2 :p 2 )^C(:2 3 p 3^: 2 3 :p 3 ) (the children's simultaneous reply that they don't know whether or not they are muddy). We now sequentially update T 1 by 1 and then by 2 three times. Note that since all children are muddy, they will have to speak three times before everyone knows he is muddy.
Consider the algorithm of De nition 3.13 and T 1 . Following the algorithm, the re ned tree T 1 1 = T 2 in Figure 7 is T 1 in which the links to states where no children are muddy have been removed. T 2 2 is then achieved by isolating worlds that do not see two worlds for every relation.
In fact, only in this case one of the formulas 3 i p i^3i :p i can fail on a point of T 2 . We can now obtain T 3 , and T 4 (shown in Figure 8 ) similarly.
Having made all the re nements, we can now check whether or not the muddy children know that they are muddy. This involves checking
which is indeed the case.
Analogously we can prove that the procedure given in Section 3 produces solutions for the other cases of the muddy children.
Note that had we decided to consider the Kripke tree truncated at n 4, the formula V 3 i=1 (p i ) K i p i ) would still be satis ed at the root after three re nements.
Let us now consider the example presented in section 2.2. By following the above described procedure with the assumption of synchronicity, the k faulty robots will announce their fault and disconnect from the system after k rounds, allowing the system to start normal production again and substitute the faulty units.
Properties of re nement on Kripke trees
In this section we analyse some more properties of the re nement procedure that we de ned in De nition 3.13.
The rst remark that we should make is that re ning a scenario by some agent's knowledge cannot a ect other agents' knowledge, as was the case in Example 2.1 for Kripke models. This is because by unravelling a Kripke model we produce a tree whose leaves are in a bijection with paths of the original model. We formalise this as follows:
Theorem 5.1 Let T be a tree, and ; two formulas, we have the following: If T j = 2 i then T 2 j j = 2 i ; with i 6 = j: Proof Nodes of a Kripke tree are in a bijection with paths of the generating model. Therefore by removing some j-links we cannot a ect the interpretation of any modality whose index is not j. The only problematic case would arise if i = j and T 2 j = ?, but this is excluded by hypothesis.
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Although the theorem above refers to in nite trees, an analogue version can be proved for truncated trees. In that case we need the rank of the formulas to be less or equal to the depth of the truncated tree minus 1.
The second point worth stressing is that Kripke trees solve the problem of Example 2.3, i.e. we can prove commutativity although the result is limited to safe formulas. First, we need to prove a few other results.
Lemma 5.2 Let T 1 = (V 1 ; E 1 ; 1 ); T 2 = (V 2 ; E 2 ; 2 ) be trees. The following hold. We show that, for universal formulas, the change made be a re nement is the minimal one possible in order to satisfy the formula:
Theorem 5.5 If is safe, then the tree (T; v) is 6-maximum in fT 0 6 T j T 0 j = v or T 0 = ?g. Proof Let T 0 = (T; v) . By part 1 of Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3, we know T 0 is in the set. To prove that it is maximum, take any T 00 in the set; we will show T 00 6 T 0 . If T 00 = ? the result is immediate; otherwise, we have T 00 j = v and T 00 6 T. Since T 00 6 T, we get (T 00 ; v) 6 (T; v) by part 2 of Lemma 5.2. But (T 00 ; v) = T 00 (since it is already T 00 j = v ) and (T; v) = T 0 ; so T 00 6 T 0 .
2 Theorem 5.6 If ; are safe, then the tree (T; v) is maximum in fT 0 6 T j T 0 j = v ^ or T 0 = ?g. Proof Let T 0 = (T; v)
. By parts 1 and 3 of Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3, we know T 0 is in the set. The argument that it is maximum is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5. Take any T 00 in the set; we will show T 00 6 T 0 . If T 00 = ? the result is immediate; otherwise, we have T 00 j = v ^ and T 00 6 T. Since T 00 6 T, we get (T 00 ; v) 6 
It is worth mentioning an example of which non-universal formulas can make commutativity to fail, independently of non-determinism.
Example 5.8 Commutativity can fail for arbitrary formulas. The problem is that if the formulas are non-universal, the order of updating can play a role in the outcome of the update and we might have that one of the two cases fail. We are so far unable to nd examples in which the two updates succeed but produce di erent result. The example we report here is the tree T 5 , illustrated in Figure 9 , where the root is the top vertex. Consider now T 6 = T 5 3 1 :p 2 1 (p _ :q), illustrated, and T 7 = T 5 2 1 (p _ :q) 3 1 :p = ?.
Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have developed the proposal in Halpern and Vardi (1991) for model re nement and model checking. We argued that model re nement could not be de ned satisfactorily on Kripke models, and proposed a de nition on Kripke trees obtained from Kripke models instead.
The shift from Kripke models to Kripke trees let us achieve two main results. First, we showed that it is possible to re ne trees by a formula expressing knowledge of a formula without a ecting the knowledge of the other agents (Theorem 5.7) -this was not apparently possible on standard Kripke models (see Example 2.1). Secondly, while it seems impossible to obtain commutativity for even safe formulas on Kripke models, we showed this is possible for Kripke trees.
Many of the issues we discussed in this note still need investigating and we refer the reader to Lomuscio and Ryan (1998) to a list of technical conjectures currently under analysis.
Although the attention in this paper is on theoretical issues, in section 2.2 we proposed an example in which these ideas can be applied. This consisted in a collective diagnosis problem among a group of homogeneous robots working at a factory. It should be clear that the scenarios commonly analysed in collective diagnosis research (see for example Fr ohlich, Nejdl and Schroeder (1998), B ottcher and Dressler (1993) , Jennings and Wittig (1992) , Schroeder (1998)) are somehow di erent from our example. Our example is much closer to scenarios coming directly from robotics.
Nowadays, robots (see McKerrow (1991) for an introduction) regularly substitute humans in many tasks. Diagnosis and maintenance in hazardous environments is one of the many important areas in which robots can clearly o er valuable solutions (NEI (1991) ). Indeed the use of robots in environmental monitoring and cleaning, especially in controlled radiation areas, and in steam generators has seen a substantial growth in the last 15 fteen years (see NEI (1992) , Gerriets (1992) ) and it is reasonable to assume that more advanced solutions will become increasingly available in the future.
In this context we believe that, although our example is not realistic at present (because it presupposes the availability of complex visual systems, etc.), it is likely and worth advocating that in the future engineering will be able to pro t from techniques such as the one presented in this paper.
Our short term research agenda includes an implementation of the algorithm exposed in this paper and further analysis of its underlying properties.
Note A presentation of part of this theory was given at PRR-98, a satellite workshop of ECAI-98.
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